Williston\u27s Fundamental Conceptions by Harding, Arthur L.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 3 
Issue 3 June 1938 Article 1 
1938 
Williston's Fundamental Conceptions 
Arthur L. Harding 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Arthur L. Harding, Williston's Fundamental Conceptions, 3 MO. L. REV. (1938) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol3/iss3/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
Missouri Law Review




The recent publication of the revised edition of Professor Williston's
Treatise on the Law of Contracts1 marks an important event in the his-
tory of American contract law. To treat a book of so extensive a scope
in a conventional book review would be but a fatuous gesture. Instead it
is here proposed to examine those fundamental conceptions of contract
law upon which the author has erected his imposing edifice.
Mr. Williston himself requires no introduction to an audience of the
Bar. Born in 1861 in the shadow of the Harvard Law School, a graduate
of that school, a member of the editorial staff of the initial volume of the
Harvard Law Review in a team featuring the names of Beale, MeKelvey,
Mack and Wigmore, Mr. Williston was appointed to the law school faculty
in 1890 and has devoted himself to the science of law and to legal educa-
tion from that time. Directing his efforts to commercial law, he published
a leading casebook on the law of Sales,2 the principal American treatise
on Sales,' a casebook on Bankruptcy,4 together with minor works.5 His
pre-eminent position in this field is further attested by the fact that he
*Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law. A.B., 1924, Uni-
versity of Arkansas; J.D., 1927, University of Michigan; S.J.D., 1932, Harvard.
Author of DOUBLE TAXATION OF PROPERTY AND INCOME (1933); Joseph Henry
Beale: Pioneer (1937) 2 Mo. L. REv. 131; and of other articles in legal period-
icals.
1. A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. By Samuel Williston; revised edi-
tion by Samuel Williston and George J. Thompson. New York: Baker, Voorhis
& Co., 1936-38. To be in eight volumes.
2. In three editions: 1894, 1905, and 1919, now published as WHMISTON
AND McCURDY, CASES ON THE LAW OF SALES (1932).
3. First edition, 1909; second edition, 1924.
4. First edition, 1901; second edition, 1915.
5. COMMERCIAL LAw (1915), revised edition, 1930; NEGOTIABLE INSTRU-
MENTS (1915), revised edition, 1931; COMMERCIAL AND BANKING LAW (1918).
(219)
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was selected to draft eight of the Uniform State Laws6 in that field. How-
ever, his particular orbit has been in the law of Contracts. Successor to
Professor Langdell, he has published a casebook in Contracts in five edi-
tions.7 His activity also resulted in the eighth edition of Parson's standard
work on Contracts8 and an American edition of Pollock's leading English
treatise." In 1920 appeared the first edition of his Treatise on Contracts.10
Hailed at its publication as a most significant contribution," this work
moved on to take its place with Wigmore on Evidence as a most influential
source of judicial decision. Since that time, the author has continued his
research and discussion of Contract law.12  These efforts culminated in
the drafting of the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of
Contracts,13 and the initial award of the American Bar Association Medal
for distinguished service to American Jurisprudence.1 4 The revised edi-
tion of the Treatise, representing this lifetime of work, is made doubly
significant by this close association with the Restatement.5 Professor
6. UNIFORM SALES ACT (1906); WAREHOUSE REcEIPTS ACT (1906); BILLS
OF LADING ACT (1909); SroCK TRANSFER ACT (1909); INTERPARTY AGREEMENT
ACT (1925); WRITTEN OBLIGATIONS ACT (1925); JOINT OBLIGATIONS ACT (1925);
VENDOR AND PURCHASER RISK ACT (1935).
7. 2 LANGDELL'S CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1894); WILLISTON,
CASES ON THE LAw OF CONTRACTS (1903), subsequent editions in 1922, 1930, and
1937.
8. Eighth edition, 1893.
9. WILLISTON'S WALD'S POLLOCK ON PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACTS, third Ameri-
can from the seventh English edition (1906).
10. A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. New York: Baker, Voorhis &
Co., 1920-1922. In four volumes.
11. See, inter alia, reviews by Charles Thaddeus Terry (1921) 34 Harv. L.
Rev. 891; Herman Oliphant (1921) 19 Mich. L. Rev. 358; Arthur L. Corbin
(1920) 29 Yale L. J. 942.
12. See, inter alia, The Effect of One Void Promise in a Bilateral Agree-
ment (1925) 25 COL. L. REv. 857; Freedom of Contract (1921) 6 CORN. L. Q.365. 13. St. Paul: American Law Institute Publishers, 1932. In two volumes.
14. See (1929) 15 A. B. A. J.
15. It is common knowledge that the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS was based
to a considerable extent upon the first edition of the TREATISE. The revised edi-
tion of the TREATISE in turn provides an "exposition of the decisions and reasons
supporting the rules of the Restatement." (Preface, p. iii). However it must
not be assumed that the revision is merely an annotated RESTATEMENT. Its refer-
ences are collated to the various RESTATEMENT sections. "The distinctive con-
tributions of the Restatement are pointed out and evaluated and the position
of the Restatement on all controversial subjects defined and supported." The
book is still Mr. Williston's TREATISE, not a digest of the law of Contracts.
"The author's plan in the original edition to test the correctness of decisions
by fundamental principles and to formulate from the cases those new principles
that are being developed by the courts with the growth of the law, rather than
simply to make a digest of decisions, has been continued." To facilitate use
with the RESTATEMENT, however, the seventh volume of the TREATISE is to con-
tain a table of RESTATEMENT citations. Missouri lawyers should find this table
2
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George Jarvis Thompson of Cornell University, co-author with Mr.
Williston in the revision, served as one of the advisers in the preparation
of the Restatement, and has had the added distinction of serving as chair-
man of the special committee of the Association of American Law Schools
in the preparation of its Selected Readings on the Law of Contracts.16
CONTRACT
Blackstonel7 defined a contract as "an agreement upon sufficient con-
sideration to do or not to do a particular thing." Echoed by Chancellor
Kent,' this definition has passed into the accepted jargon of American
law.19  However, every word of this stock phrase has been attacked. It
is urged that the word "agreement" is fully as difficult to define as is
"contract;" that the definition merely obscures the truth.20 Next it is
maintained that, while an agreement is essential to simple contracts, the
classical common law enforced promises under seal where there was no
vestige of agreement." As a final objection to the use of the word "agree-
ment" it is insisted that even in the case of simple contracts the agree-
ment relied upon may be more fanciful than real; that many undertak-
invaluable when used in conjunction with their MissouRi ANNOTATIONS TO THE
RESTATEMENT (edited by Williams and Eberle).
16. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931. Mr. Thompson, a graduate
of the Harvard Law School, has practiced in New York and in Massachusetts.
He has been a professor of law in Pei Yang University, Tientsin, China, and in
the University of Pittsburgh Law School, and, since 1926, in the Cornell Law
School.
17. 2 COMM.* 442.
18. 2 KENT, COMM. *449.
19. CAL. CIV. CODE (Chase, 1935) § 1550 provides: "It is essential to the
existence of a contract that there should be: (1) Parties capable of contracting.
(2) Their consent. (3) A lawful object. (4) A sufficient consideration." See,
also, GEORGIA CODE (1933) § 20-107.
20. 2 STEPH. COMM. 109. There is great difficulty concerning the proper
derivation of "agreement." Some legal writers have assumed that it is derived
from aggregatio mentium, a flocking together of minds, roughly akin to conventio.
BOuvIER, LAW DICT. tit. Contract. This appears to be etymologically incorrect.
It is definitely established that the word "agree" is derived from ad gratus,
pleasing. This derivation is best reflected in the adjective "agreeable." The
suffix -menmt is not derived from mens, mind, but is merely the common Latin end-
ing denoting a quality, condition, or state of being. It will be seen that this
difference of opinion as to the derivation of the word reflects a century-long
conflict as to the proper place of the wills of the parties in the formation of
contracts.
21. Thus one might be held on an instrument bearing his seal, even though
it appeared that his seal had been stolen and its impression placed upon the doc-
ument without his consent. AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY (1913) 98.
Similarly, if one paid the obligation under seal but neglected to have it destroyed
or cancelled, he could be held thereon again. Id. at 109.
3
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ings are enforced as contracts where the parties are not in agreement and
perhaps do not even appear to be.
22
Turning to the second part of the Blackstonian definition, it is urged
that consideration has no part in the definition of contract since the com-
mon law enforced contracts without consideration.23 Even if it be ad-
mitted, as contended by some,24 that specialties are not properly within
the field of contract, it is an undeniable fact that since Blackstone's time,
the courts following Lord Mansfield's example 2- have enforced promises
upon some theory of natural justice without reference to technical notions
of consideration. 6 The label "moral consideration" attached to these
cases is but an apology. A definition hardly defines when it is found
necessary to redefine the words used therein.2 7  And then in recent years
we have witnessed a revival of the oldest notion of assumpsit as enforc-
ing a liability akin to deceit in favor of the plaintiff who has misrelied
upon the promise of the defendant,2 8 and courts have allowed an action
22. Infra.
23. It is to be noted that two commonly quoted American definitions omit
any reference to consideration. Chief Justice Marshall in Sturges v. Crowin-
shield, 17 U. S. 122, 197 (1819); Chief Justice Taney in Charles River Bridge
Case, 36 U. St 420, 572 (1837).
24. 1 ELLIOTT, CONTRACTS (1913) 3.
25. Atkins v. Hill, Cowp. 284 (1775), enforcing a gratuitous promise by an
executor, having assets of the estate sufficient for the purpose, to pay a pecu-
niary legacy; Barnes v. Hedley, 2 Taunt. 184 (1809), enforcing a gratuitous
promise by a borrower to pay the lawful portion of a debt uncollectible for usury;
Watson v. Turner, Buller's N.P. 129 (1767), enforcing a promise by the overseers
of the poor to pay for expenses incurred in curing a pauper.
26. There are of course numerous judicial statements limiting or repudiating
the doctrine of moral consideration urged by Lord Mansfield. Eastwood v.
Kenyon, 11 A. & E. 438 (1840); Mills v. Wyman, 3 Pick. 207 (1825). However
in some of the United States, broad doctrines of moral consideration appear
to continue in force. Olsen v. Hagan, 102 Wash. 321, 172 Pac. 1173 (1918);
Holland v. Martinson, 119 Kan. 43, 237 Pac. 902 (1925). GEORGIA CODE (1933)
§ 20-303: "Considerations are distinguished into good and valuable. A good
consideration is such as is founded upon natural duty and affection, or on a
strong moral consideration." CAL. CIV. CODE (Chase, 1935) § 1606: "An existing
legal obligation resting upon the promisor, or a moral obligation originating in
some benefit conferred upon the promisor or prejudice suffered by the promisee,
is also a good consideration for a promise, to an extent corresponding with the
extent of the obligation, but no further or otherwise."
27. "When a man gives us his sense of a word in a definition, what one
expects is that he should stick to it; that in that sense he should always use the
word, and in that only. Words are the dress which a writer puts his ideas into,
for the reader to get acquainted with them. 'Hark ye me,' says he, 'whenever
you see this word, you may take for granted this idea is o' the inside of it';
if after this he watches his opportunity when the reader's back is turned, takes
the word up again, whips the first idea out of it and puts another in its place,
how is it that his readers are to understand him?" BENTHAM, COMMENT ON THE
COMMENTARIES (1775) 31.
28. Beale, Gratuitous Undertakings (1911) 5 HARv. L. REv. 222; Ames, The
History of Assumpsit (1882) 2 HARV. L. REv. 1; Ames, Two Theories of Con-
4
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for breach of contract to one who sustained substantial injury because of
reasonable and foreseeable misreliance upon the gratuitous promise of the
defendant. 9 In these cases there is little attempt to reconcile the result
with the traditional doctrine of consideration. Instead "promissory
estoppel" or some similar phrase is used as a substitute for considera-
tion."
Most of the various definitions attempted agree that a contract con-
templates some action or forbearance by a party thereto." However it
may be urged, as by Holmes,12 that the function of contract has to do with
bearing or shifting the incidence of risk attached to mundane transactions.
It would then be argued that the undertaking of the party to the con-
tract is not that he will do or will not do a certain thing, but merely that
he will be answerable for the consequences of the event.33
sideration (1899) 12 HARv. L. REv. 515, 13 id. at 29; Pound, Consideration in
Equity (1919) 13 ILL. L. Ruv. 667.
29. Devecmon v. Shaw, 69 Md. 199, 144 Atl. 464 (1888), plaintiff made a
pleasure trip to Europe, relying on his uncle's promise to reimburse him for ex-
pense; Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 77 N. W. 365 (1898), plaintiff gave up
her job relying on her grandfather's promise to make her a gift of a sum of
money; Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Century Realty Co., 220 Mo. 522, 119
S. W. 400 (1909), relying on voluntary promise of lessor to waive restriction in
lease and to consent to sublease to a satisfactory sublessee, the lessee at con-
siderable expense arranged to sublet to a satisfactory tenant. Thus charitable
subscriptions have been held enforceable where the charity makes expenditures or
incurs obligations in reliance thereon. Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua
County Bank, 246 N. Y. 369, 159 N. E. 173 (1927); Southwestern College v.
Hawley, 144 Kan. 652, 62 P. (2d) 850 (1936) ; Commissioner v. Bryn Mawr Trust
Co., 87 F. (2d) 607 (C. C. A. 3d, 1936); Carver, Consideration in Charitable
Subscriptions (1928) 13 CORN. L. Q. 270; Billig, Consideration in Charitable Sub-
scriptions (1927) 12 CORN. L. Q. 467. Other recent cases impose a liability for
nonfeasance upon a gratuitous bailee or agent where it appears that the promisee
has relied upon this undertaking to his detriment. Siegel v. Spear & Co., 234
N. Y. 479, 138 N. E. 414 (1923), promise by gratuitous bailee to procure fire
insurance on property bailed; Carr v. Maine Cent. R. R., 78 N. H. 402, 102 Atl.
532 (1917), promise by railroad to forward to the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission papers necessary to enable the plaintiff shipper to obtain a reparation;
Sunflower Compress Co. v. Clark, 165 Miss. 219, 144 So. 477, 145 So. 617 (1932),
gratuitous undertaking to cash a certain check and to pay taxes with the pro-
ceeds thereof, performance being unreasonably delayed until after the drawee
bank had failed; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) § 378.
30. See Cardozo, J., in Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County
Bank, 246 N. Y. 369, 159 N. E. 173 (1927). It is important to note that the
English Law Revision Committee of 1934 recommended a statutory modification
of the law of consideration along the line of these American cases. (1937) 15
CAN. BAR REV. 585, 607. Lorenzen, Causa and Consideration in the Law of
Contracts (1919) 28 YALE L. J. 621; Ballantine, Is the Doctrine of Considera-
tion Senseless and Illogical (1913) 11 MICH. L. Rnv. 423; Shattuck, Gratuitous
Promises-A New Writ? (1937) 35 MICH. L. REv. 908; Wright, Ought the Doc-
trine of Consideration to be Abolished From the Common Law (1936) 49 HAnv.
L. REv. 1225.
31. Supra notes 17, 18, 23.
32. THE COMMON LAW (1881) 297 et seq.
33. This is obviously applicable to such things as warranties of quality,
et cetera, in contracts of sale.
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A final criticism of the stock definition is that it is too broad; that
"contract" connotes legal enforcibility.34 It must be admitted that not
every agreement which would satisfy Blackstone's definition would be
enforceable at common law.3 5 On the other hand, the word has been em-
ployed to describe numerous relationships protected under the "obliga-
tion of contracts" clause of the United States Constitution,36 and moves
on to such extremes as the Rousseauist Social Contract.
Turning from these varied definitions to that of Mr. Williston we find
that a contract is defined as "a promise, or set of promises, for breach of
which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some
way recognizes as a duty."3'7 The author then adopts the Restatement3"
definition of a promise as "an undertaking that something shall happen
or that something shall not happen in the future."39 This promise may
therefore be either (a) an undertaking to do or not to do something; or
(b) an undertaking to cause something to be done or not to be done; or
(c) an undertaking to be answerable for "such proximate damages as
may be caused by the failure to happen or the happening of the specified
event, or by the existence or non-existence of the asserted state of facts.""
Some doubt has been expressed whether promise is precisely the word
to embrace these three related concepts."- Without entering into the merits
of this controversy it appears sufficient at this time to stress the fact
that the word, when employed by Mr. Williston, must be so defined.
The most striking aspect of this definition is that it contains no men-
tion of agreement, mutual assent, or similar terms. It is conceded that
something in the nature of mutual assent or agreement is usually necessary
to the formation of informal contracts, 2 but not essential to contracts in
the widest permissible sense. Contract therefore includes formal con-
34. ANSON, CONTRACTS (5th Am. ed. 1930) 7.
35. Thus we have illegal "contracts," infant's "contracts," and the like.
36. Including such things as corporate charters, Dartmouth College v. Wood-
ward, 17 U. S. 518 (1819); grants of public lands, Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U. S.
87 (1810); Green v. Biddle, 21 U. S. 1 (1823); public utility franchises, Boise
Artesian etc. Water Co. v. Boise City, 230 U. S. 84 (1913); tax exemptions, New
Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U. S. 164 (1812).
37. TREATISE § 1.
38. §2.
39. TREATISE § 1A.
40. RESTATEMENT § 2 (2).
41. See Goble, Is an Offer a Promise (1928) 22 ILL. L. REv. 567; Mr. Wil-
liston's answer, id. at 788; Professor Green's replication, 23 id. at 95; Mr.
Williston's rejoinder, id. at 100; Professor Green's surrejoinder, id. at 301.
42. TRFATISE § 18.
6
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tracts, such as promises under seal, negotiable instruments, recognizances. 4
Judgments, often miscalled "contracts of record," would not be included
because of lack of promissory aspect. Against the use of the word agree-
ment it is argued that it is much too broad (a) in that it includes executed
transactions such as completed sales,"4 while a contract in the true sense
looks to the future; and (b) in that it includes all sorts of consensual
relationships giving rise to no legally sanctioned duties.45  To Air.
Williston, these imperfections are fatal. There can be a contract only
so long as there is something yet to be done, or some duty yet owed there-
under. What many call an "executed contract" is no contract at all.46
So, too, a contract must contemplate some duty of performance. It may
be imperfect in that one party has a legal privilege to avoid or minimize
his duties thereunder, as in the common cases of contracts voidable for
infancy, fraud, or other causes.47 It is not necessary that the contract
be enforceable by direct action, so long as the performance of the con-
tract is in any way recognized as a legal duty.4" Thus we may have void-
able contracts, unenforceable contracts, but void contracts are beyond
the pale.
It is also to be noted that this definition makes no mention of con-
sideration. The inclusion of formal contracts in the definition necessarily
excludes consideration as sine qua non. The point is also made that while
consideration, like mutual consent, is usually required for informal con-
tracts, it is even there not indispensable.4 9
43. TaEATisE §§ 4-7.
44. It must be remembered that the stock definitions embodying the word
agreement are derived from BLACKSTONE, op. cit. supra note 17. As Mr. Williston
has pointed out, Blackstone was writing primarily of completed transactions,
with particular reference to sales and conveyancing. Indeed his discussion of con-
tracts is under the general heading of Title by Contract. It must also be re-
membered that BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES were based on a series of lectures
instituted in 1753, and that the COMMENTARIES appeared in 1765-69. During this
period our law of informal contracts was but aborning.
45. TREATISE §§ 1 and 2. Mr. Williston's position is best set out in a letter
published in (1929) 5 Wis. L. REv. 233.
46. TREATISE § 14.
47. TREATISE § 15.
48. TREATIsE § 16. Included would be most situations involving contracts
with public bodies not suable in ordinary proceedings, contracts not complying
with the Statute of Frauds, contracts the remedy on which is barred by limita-
tions, and many cases of illegal contracts.
49. TREATISE § 18. See infra.
7
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MUTuAL ASSENT
Necessity. As has been seen Mr. Williston does not regard agreement
or mutual assent as indispensable to the formation of a contract. Thus
one might become liable upon a promise under seal without intending so
to do.50 The author also approves the English doctrine that a promise
under seal is operative to create rights in the obligee without his knowledge
or assent, subject of course to the privilege of the obligee to enter a
disclaimer.5" Where the sealed instrument is bilateral in form and pur-
ports to create return obligations on the obligee, his assent would be
necessary.2 Similarly assent by the payee is not required to create a
binding obligation in the form of a negotiable instrument. 3
While it is stated that informal contracts usually require a manifesta-
tion of mutual assent,54 Mr. Williston adopts the phraseology of the Re-
statement55 that certain informal contracts may be made without it. Chief
in interest among these would be the promissory estoppel cases where,
in the language of the Restatement,56 "A promise which the promisor
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and
substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise." 5 7 In such a case there is no mutual assent,
50. TREATISE § 205.
51. TREATISE § 213; RESTATEMENT § 104.
52. RESTATEMENT § 105.
53. TREATISE § 221. See Lawrence v. Scurry, 187 Iowa 1055, 175 N. W. 22
(1919). It must be admitted however that most of the cases one finds cited
for this proposition phrase it in terms of a presumption of assent by the payee.
In re Stockham's Estate, 193 Iowa 823, 182 N. W. 650 (1922).
54. "A manifestation of mutual assent by the parties who form the con-
tract to the terms thereof and by each promisor to the consideration for his
promise." TRIATIsE § 18.
55. RESTATEMENT, c. 3, topic 4, is titled: "Informal Contracts Without As-
sent or Consideration."
56. § 90; TREATISE §§ 139 and 140.
57. There are numerous cases supporting this section in result, though
with great diversity as to phraseology and reasoning in the opinions. The
19promissory estoppel" language is apparent in School District of Kansas City v.
Sheidley, 138 Mo. 672, 40 S. W. 656 (1897); Hardin College v. Johnson, 221 Mo.
App. 285, 3 S. W. (2d) 264 (1928); both cases in the field of charitable sub-
scriptions. The theory appears to be latent in the well-known case of Underwood
Typewriter Co. v. Century Realty Co., 220 Mo. 522, 119 S. W. 400 (1909). See
also, Lawson v. Edwards, 293 S. W. 794 (Mo. App. 1927), and material cited
supra notes 29 and 30.
This doctrine is closely related to the equity practice of enforcing a promise
to make a gift of land where the prospective donee in reliance thereon makes
valuable and permanent improvements thereon. Seavey v. Drake, 62 N. H. 393
(1882); Dozier v. Matson, 94 Mo. 328, 7 S. W. 268 (1888); Pound, Consideration
8
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but the mental element approaches more nearly that in the tort of
deceit.5" The promise is made by one intending, or knowing, or under
such circumstances that the promisor should reasonably expect, the
promisee to act thereon. The promisee may or may not express assent.
The important thing is that he does act thereon to his detriment as should
have been expected. 9
Also classed by Mr. Williston as informal contracts without mutual
assent are promises by a discharged surety to pay the principal debt, 60
promises by a discharged bankrupt to pay the discharged debt ;61 promises
by a debtor to pay a debt, action on which is barred by limitations.
8 2
While some have argued that these are cases of "waiver" and not new
contracts,8 Mr. Williston persists in the latter definition."
Nature of mutual assent. Once we have determined that mutual as-
sent must be shown in a particular case, the problem is, What is mutual
in Equity (1919) 13 ILL. L. REV. 667. See also, POMEROY ON SPECIFIC PERFORM-
ANCE (3d ed. 1926) §§ 130 and 131; 3 PARsoNs ON CONTRACTS (9th ed. 1904)
*359.
Section 90 of the RESTATEMENT has been before several courts. It is sus-
tained in Langer v. Superior Steel Corp., 105 Pa. Super. 579, 161 Atl. 571 (1932);
McCowen v. McCord, 49 Ga. App. 358, 175 S. E. 593 (1934); Greiner v. Greiner,
131 Kan. 760, 293 Pac. 759 (1930); Lusk-Harbison-Jones v. Universal Credit
Co., 332 Mo. 1128, 61 S. W. (2d) 933 (1933); Fluckey v. Anderson, 132 Neb.
664, 273 N. W. 41 (1937).
58. It is of course common learning that the common law action of assump-
sit developed from the primitive common law action for deceit, and that the
deceit cases share with the action of debt the somewhat questionable honor of
giving us our doctrine of consideration. Supra note 28.
59. One must be careful however not to push the deceit analogy too far.
Historically the deceit cases required that the misrepresentation be fraudulently
or recklessly made and with an intent that the other person act thereon. It
was one of the few fields of the law where one was not liable for the ordinary
foreseeable consequences of his conduct. It is only recently that the courts are
beginning to find liability in deceit on arguments akin to common law theories
of negligence. As stated by Section 90 of the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, the
promissory estoppel doctrine does not require that the reliance by the promisee
on the promise shall have been intended, but merely that the promisor should
reasonably have expected the making of the promise to induce action on the
part of the promisee. TREATISE § 140.
60. TREATISE § 157; RESTATEMENT § 88(1).
61. TREATISE § 158; RESTATEMENT § 87. These cases are frequently stated
in terms of the old debt as constituting a moral consideration for the new
promise, as in the basic ase of Trueman v. Fenton, Cowp. 544 (1777). Stanek
v. White, 172 Minn. 390, 215 N. W. 784 (1927); Wislizenus v. O'Fallon, 91 Mo.
184, 3 S. W. 837 (1887); Farmers' & Merchants' Bank of Vandalia v. Richards,
119 Mo. App. 18, 95 S. W. 290 (1906); Boone County Milling & Elevator Co. v.
Lowery, 248 S. W. 623 (Mo. App. 1923).
62. TREATISE §§ 160 et seq.; RESTATEMENT § 86. Davis v. Herring, 6 Mo.
21 (1839); Chidsey v. Powell, 91 Mo. 622, 4 S. W. 446 (1887).
63. See, inter alia, Boyd v. Hurlbut, 41 Mo. 264 (1867) ; Shannon v. Austin,
67 Mo. 485 (1878).
64. TREATISE § 203.
9
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assent? The old-time answers unhesitatingly: "Meeting of the minds of
the parties."65 While this language persists in the cases to considerable
degree, both courts and writers agree that, with certain infrequent ex-
ceptions,6 6 the issue of mutual assent is no longer decided by a probing
into the precise mental conditions of the parties6  Rather, we are con-
cerned with mental condition so far as it is made manifest by the words
and other acts of the parties.6 8 So far most of us agree. But why this
stress upon external manifestations? Those who view the law of con-
tracts as a striving toward the maximum effectuation of the human will,
tend to insist that this stress is dictated only by the necessities of judicial
proof, that objective acts are the only reliable proof of concurrent intent.69
But there is another factor. The social interest in the security of com-
mercial transactions requires that a party to a contract, having received
some manifestation of assent from the other party, be protected in a rea-
sonable reliance thereon.7 0 To state the problem in another way: Granted
65. The ubiquity of this outmodel clich6 of 18th-century metaphysics should
serve as a constant reminder of the over-toughness of habits of speech and of
thought in the common law.
66. Thus where the offer is such as to require the doing of an act as the
acceptance, and the offeree has done the act, it is always open to inquiry whether
he did so with the intention of accepting the offer. TREATIsE § 67; Restatement
§§ 55 and 71. Where an offeror states to the offeree that the offeree's silence will
be considered an acceptance, and the offeree does not reply, whether or not there
is a contract will depend upon the actual intent of the offeree. TREATISE § 91B;
RESTATEMENT § 72 (1, b); Botkin v. McIntyre, 81 Mo. 557 (1884). Cf. Prescott
v. Jones, 69 N. H. 305, 41 Atl. 352 (1898). If one party employs language which
is subject to latent ambiguity, but without knowledge and without being legally
charged with notice of the facts giving rise to the ambiguity, there is no contract
unless it appear that the other party actually interpreted the language in the
way originally intended. TREATISE § 95; RESTATEMENT § 71 (a); Raffles v. Wichel-
haus, 2 H. & C. 906 (1864); Snoderly v. Bowder, 30 Idaho 484, 166 Pac. 265
(1917); Pette v. Omega Chapter of Alpha Gamma Rho, 86 N. H. 419, 171 At.
441 (1934).
67. Famous is the dictum of Judge Learned Hand: "A contract has, strictly
speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent of the parties.
A contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of law to certain acts
of the parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany and represent a known
intent. If, however, it were proved by twenty bishops that either party, when he
used the word intended something else from the usual meaning which the law
imposes upon them, he would still be held, unless there were some mutual mis-
take, or something else of the sort. Of course, if it appear by other words or acts
of the parties, that they attribute a peculiar meaning to such words as they use
in the contract, that meaning will prevail, but only by virtue of the other words,
and not because of their unexpressed intent." Hotchkiss v. National City Bank,
200 Fed. 287. 293 (S. D. N. Y. 1911), quoted with approval in TREATISE § 94.
68. Cf. POLLOK ON CONTRACTS (10th ed. 1936) 462 et seq.
69. See Roscoe Pound in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCmNCES 323
(1931).
70. "I hold no brief for the will theory of legal transactions. On the con-
trary, I should argue for a theory of enforcing the realization of reasonable ex-
pectations, in order to maintain the general security, and should contend that
10
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that we are to judge intent on the basis of objective acts, through whose
spectacles do we view those acts? Those of a hypothetical reasonable man,
a disinterested third person, or those of a reasonably prudent offeree?
In a great many cases we reach the same conclusion whether the one
test or the other is employed, but in others there will be striking differences
in result. A few examples will suffice.
Take the simple case where an offer is sent by telegram quoting a price
of $22 per ton. As delivered to the offeree, the telegram reads $21 per ton.
The offeree, having no reason to know that there has been a mistake in
transmission, 71 replies simply, "I accept your offer." If the problem is
merely proving intent by objective evidence, a comparison of the telegram
as sent and the telegram as delivered establishes beyond doubt that there
was no mutual assent, and some cases have so held.72 On the other hand,
if our interest is primarily in protecting the offeree in his reasonable
reliance upon the offer as made manifest to him, we should find a valid
contract between the parties at a price of $21. It appears that this is the
result reached in most cases. 78 A number of cases get all tangled up in the
issue of whether the telegraph company is the "agent" of the offeror.
That it is not an agent appears clear, 74 but this issue often serves to divert
the court's attention from the real problem involved.75 Mr. Williston sup-
it meets the requirements of the law of torts better than the purely ethical doc-
trine of liability as a corollary of fault, and meets the requirements of the law
of contracts better than the seventeenth-century doctrine of the inherent moral
force of promises or the nineteenth-century doctrine of giving effect to the will."
Pound, Consideration in Equity (1919) 13 ILL. L. REv. 435, 459. Cf. Gardner,
An Inquiry into the Principles of the Law of Contracts (1932) 46 HARv. L. REV.
1, 33; ANSON, CONTRACTS (5th Am. ed. 1930) 4 n.
71. If the offeree knows or under all the circumstances may be charged
with notice of the error in transmission, there would be neither real nor ap-
parent assent on the part of the offeror, and the cases would agree that the pur-
ported acceptance would be inoperative. RESTATEMENT § 71(c); TREATIsE § 94;
Germain Fruit Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 137 Cal. 598, 70 Pac. 658 (1902);
Hardman Lumber Co. v. Keystone Mfg. Co., 86 W. Va. 404, 103 S. E. 282 (1920);
Buckberg v. Washburn-Crosby Co., 115 Mo. App. 701, 92 S. W. 733 (1906).
72. Some writers tend to state this in terms of tort law; that the offeror
is not to be liable unless he has knowingly or negligently misled the offeree.
Whittier, The Restatement of Contracts and Mutual Assent (1929) 17 CALIF. L.
RaV. 441; Gardner, loc. cit. supra note 70. Mr. Williston's best discussion of this
thesis is contained in his article, Mutual Assent in the Formation of Contracts
(1919) 14 ILL. L. Ry. 85.
73. The best known case is Ayer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 79 Me. 493, 10
Atl. 495 (1887). See also, Des Arc Oil Mill v. Western Union Tel. Co., 132 Ark.
335, 201 S! W. 273 (1918); Sherrerd v. Western Union Tel. Co., 146 Wis. 197,
131 N. W. 341 (1911).
74. See Ewing, The Effect on the Formnation of a Contract of a Telegraphic
Mistake in an Offer (1933) 3 IDAHO L. J. 107.
75. Henkel v. Pape, L. R. 6 Exch. 7 (1870); Strong v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 18 Idaho 409, 109 Pac. 910 (1910); Pepper v. Western Union Tel. Co., 87
11
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ports the cases finding a contract in this case but without making it clear
upon what theory, being content to say: "The test of the true interpreta-
tion of an offer or acceptance is not what the party making it thought it
meant or intended it to mean, but what a reasonable person in the position
of the parties would have thought it meant." 76
Or take the case where the offer is to sell unique property, such as cer-
tain land, and while it is still open the offeror sells the property to another
person. If the fact of this sale is made known to the offeree he cannot there-
after accept the original offer.7 7 The difficulty arises where the offeree pur-
ports to accept without knowledge of the prior sale. If we are interested
merely in proving intent by unequivocal objective evidence, the fact of
prior sale to one other than the offeree would suffice to disprove mutual
assent.7 8 If the interest is to protect the offeree in his reasonable expecta-
tions, the fact of prior sale, until known to the offeree, would be imma-
terial.79 With this result Mr. Williston accords.80 Indeed his interest in the
security of transactions here compels an expression of doubt as to whether
the offeree should ever be required to rely upon information indirectly
received, or whether as an ethical proposition the offeror should not be
held to a duty of direct notification.81
Another problem arises where a written offer is received by the offeree,
is signed by him and returned to the offeror without the offeree's knowing
its contents.8 2 Suppose further that it can be established beyond doubt,
without recourse to the offeree's own evidence, that he was ignorant of the
nature and terms of this paper. In such a case there would seem to be
Tenn. 554, 11 S. W. 783 (1889); Holtz v. Western Union Tel. Co., 3 N. E. (2d)
180 (Mass. 1936); (1937) 21 MINN. L. Rnv. 209. All of these cases correctly de-
cide that the telegraph company is not the agent of the offeror. They assume
without extended discussion that this is conclusive on the issue of the existence
of a contract.
76. TREATIsE § 94 (Italics mine).
77. Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. D. 463 (1876); Frank v. Stratford-Handcock,
13 Wyo. 37, 77 Pac. 134 (1904). See generally, Oliphant, The Duration and
Termination of an Offer (1920) 18 MicH. L. REv. 201; Whittier, supra note 72,
at 447; Corbin, The Restatement of the Common Law by the American Law
Institute (1929) 15 IowA L. REv. 19, 36; RESTATEMENT § 42.
78. See Cooke v. Oxley, 3 T. R. 653 (1790).
79. Parks, Indirect Revocation and Termination of Offers by Death (1920)
19 MIcH. L. REv. 152.
80. TREATISE § 56.
81. TREATISE § 57: "Must the offeree give credit at his peril to hap-hazard
information, or what degree of certainty or probability must exist in order to
make the words of an outsider effectual to revoke the offer?" Here, Mr. Williston
goes the full distance in espousing the reasonable expectations test.
82. TREATISE § 35; RESTATEMENT § 70.
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sufficient objective proof of lack of mutual assent and, if this be the
criterion, the signer should not be bound . 3 If the criterion is the reason-
able misreliance of the person receiving the signed paper, the inquiry
should be whether he knew or had reason to know that the paper had been
signed in ignorance of its terms.8 4 While most of the cases recognize this
distinction, some carry their concern over the security of transactions so
far as to say that in all cases the offeree is to be bound by the paper neg-
igently signed.8 5 This is too broad. While negligence is important in
establishing the signing as a voluntary act,86 it appears to be confusing
83. In TREATISE § 95A, Mr. Williston takes the position that one who
signs a paper without negligence and in ignorance of its contents is not liable
to the other party. Most of the cases cited for this proposition involve facts
indicating that the offeror knew that the offeree did not know the contents of
the paper, as where the offeror had misrepresented its contents, or had switched
papers prior to the signing. Some of the cases more properly involve equitable
defenses of fraud, rather than common law defenses of no mutual assent. Sup-
pose however that the offeror merely mails a written offer, and the offeree re-
turns it bearing a written acceptance. It is believed that in such a case, the
security of business transactions requires that the offeror be freed of any risk
of inquiry into the circumstances under which it was signed, other than the one
of the existence of contractual capacity on the part of the offeree at the time of
signing.
84. Supra note 83. See Johnson v. Shell Oil Co., 185 Wash. 393, 55 P. (2d)
609, 63 P. (2d) 483 (1936); Commerce Sec. Corp. v. Hays, 60 S. W. (2d) 335
(Tex. Civ. App. 1933); (1934) 12 Tmx. L. REv. 228; (1936) 34 MICH. L. REv. 705.
85. See Milner v. Earl Fruit Co., 40 Idaho 339, 232 Pac. 581 (1925); Bradley
v. Industrial Comm., 76 P. (2d) 745 (Ariz. 1938); Std. Mfg. Co. v. Slot, 121 Wis.
14, 98 N. W. 923 (1904). On logical grounds it appears impossible to hold that
there is a contract where the offeror knows that the written offer has been ac-
cepted by the offeree in ignorance of its terms. There is no actual meeting of
the minds. The offeror does not even believe that there is a meeting of the
minds. If the offeror desires to assert the negligence of the offeree, he is met
by the fact that the negligence has in no way misled or injured the offeror.
Negligence which has resulted in no harm is hardly a legal offense. The only
weighty argument which the offeror can advance is that it would seriously un-
settle all transactions to allow the signer of the document to show his own neg-
ligence in defense. Even this argument cannot be taken too seriously in the
common case where it appears that the offeror has misrepresented the contents
of the document which the offeree has negligently signed. As is said by the
author of the excellent comment in (1936) 34 MICH. L. REv. 705, at 709, "From
a policy viewpoint, it would seem that, other things being equal, it would be
better to punish fraud than negligence." See generally, Crim v. Crim, 162 Mo.
544, 63 S. W. 489 (1901); Donnelley v. Missouri-Lincoln Trust Co., 239 Mo. 370,
39 S. W. 794 (1912); International Text-Book Co. v. Anderson, 179 Mo. App. 631,
162 S. W. 641 (1913).
86. There is still some uncertainty as to the minimum of contractual in-
tent required. It is not required in the common law that it appear affirmatively
that the parties intended to create a legal contract. RESTATEMENT § 20. Cf.
Whittier, loc. cit. supra note 72. If the party has intentionally or negligently
done the act which amounts to an appearance of assent, he is liable thereon,
even though he did not understand the full legal consequences of what he was
doing. TRETISE § 95A. Mr. Williston however hesitates to carry this doctrine
beyond the point where the signer of a writing knew or at least was negligent
in not knowing that it was a legal or business document. A logical development
13
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the issues to rely on negligence to enforce as a contract something not satis-
fying any standard of mutual assent. There is nothing in the Parol Evi-
dence Rule to require such a result.8 7 Mr. Williston plumps squarely for
this position, prefacing his remarks with the significant statement:
"Throughout the formation of contracts it is to be observed that not assent,
but what the other party is justified as regarding as assent, is essential.'"'8
Again turning to the matter of contracts by correspondence, we find
the issue of the effective date of a mailed revocation or of a mailed rejec-
tion. Proof of the posting of a letter of revocation would meet the require-
ment of proof of change of intent by objective unequivocal act, and if this
be the test would suffice to prevent the formation of a contract. This
has been so argued. 9 Similarly it has been maintained that proof of the
mailing of a rejection is sufficient evidence of lack of assent to prevent the
formation of a contract thereafter." If our interest is in protecting the
of the objective standard hawever would appear to lead to the result that the
intent required is merely the intent to sign the document to which the signature
was actually affixed, without inquiry into whether the signer thought that it was
an acceptance or a petition for old-age relief. If it appeared that the signer
had intentionally affixed his signature, the only remaining inquiry would be
whether the other party to the contract was reasonably led to believe that the
signature indicated the signer's assent to the bargain expressed therein. "If the
manifestation is at variance with the mental intent, subject to the slight ex-
ception stated in section 71, it is the expression which is controlling. Not mutual
assent but a manifestation indicating such assent is what the law requires."
RESTATEMENT § 20, comment a. (As to the exceptions in § 71, see notes 66 and
71, supra.) See also, RESTATEMENT § 55, comment c. Section 70, however, pro-
vides that "One who makes a written offer which is accepted, or who manifests
acceptance by the terms of a writing which he should reasonably understand to be
an offer or proposed contract, is bound by the contract, although ignorant of the
terms of the writing or of its proper interpretation." (Italics mine.) Note:
Since the above was written I have discovered the case of Hotz v. Equitable
Life Assur. Soc., 276 N. W. 413 (Iowa, 1937), veritably a unique case, but one
which appears fully to sustain what might be called the extreme position which
I have taken. See (1938) 36 MICH. L. REv. 1008.
87. The sine qua non of the parol evidence rule is that the parties have
actually made a contract in integrated form. The rule is not applicable to de-
fenses which would show that the contract never came into existence. TREATISE
§ 634; JONES, COMMENTARIES ON EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1926) § 1511. Cf. WIGMORE
ON EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §§ 2413-2417.
88. TREArISE § 35.
89. Cooke v. Oxley, 3 T. R. 653 (1790), the case most frequently cited for
this proposition may be so explained. The obscure reasoning employed may also
be said to support the meeting-of-the-minds test of mutual assent. See, also,
Routledge v. Grant, 4 Bing. 653 (1828). Whittier, loc. cit. supra note 72, argues
in support of such a provision contained in CAL. CIrv. CODE, 1583. See Watters v.
Lincoln, 29 S. D. 98. 135 N. W. 712 (1912).
90. Hunt v. Higman, 70 Iowa 406, 30 N. W. 769 (1886). The arguments for
such a result usually do not develop the problem of proof of mutual assent, but
tend to rely simply on the analogy of the mailed acceptance which would become
effective on mailing. As will be seen however the acceptance cases rest squarely
upon the now outmoded concept of proof of mutual assent.
14
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addressee of such a revocation or rejection in his reasonable assumptions,
the result would be the other way. Thus it is almost universally held that
the offeree will be protected in assuming the offer to be open until notice
of the revocation is received. 9' Similarly it has been held that one who
mails a rejection may thereafter accept,9 2 provided his acceptance be com-
municated to the offeror prior to the communication of the rejection.9" So
long as the offeror does not know of the mailed rejection and has had no
reason to change his position because of it, he is in no position to complain.
Mr. Williston agrees that the uncommunicated revocation is ineffective,
without saying exactly why.9' So, too, in the case of the uncommunicated
rejection."
It is settled beyond controversy that a mailed acceptance of an offer
received by mail is legally effective when mailed. 6 With this proposition
Mr. Williston agrees, 7 although the doctrine was first established on a
theory of objective proof of intent as being sufficient without proof of
communication.9 8 What was thought to be the obvious convenience of this
91. RESTATEMENT § 41. See Byrne v. Van Tienhoven Co., 5 C. P. D. 344(1880); Stevenson v. McLean, 5 Q. B. D. 346 (1880); Brauer v. Shaw, 168 Mass.
198, 46 N. E. 617 (1897) ; Patrick v. Bowman, 149 U. S. 411 (1893) ; Malloy v.
Drumheller, 68 Wash. 106, 122 Pac. 1005 (1912) ; Price v. Atkinson, 117 Mo. App.
52, 94 S. W. 816 (1906); Sarran v. Richards, 151 Mo. App. 656, 132 S W. 285
(1910).
92. One practical difficulty would arise where the recipient of a mailed
offer mailed a rejection and immediately thereafter mailed an acceptance, and
then claimed that the rejection was not effective until received by the offeror,
but that the acceptance was good when deposited in the mails. Viewing the
transaction as we should from the position of the offeror, the only fair solution
is to bind the offeree by that communication which first reaches the offeror. See
Ashley, Must the Rejection of an Offer be Communicated to the Offeror? (1903)
12 YALE L. J. 419; Oliphant, loc. cit. supra note 77; Corbin, loc. cit. supra note
11.
93. RESTATEMENT § 39. Curiously enough there appear to be no decisions
squarely on this point.
94. TREATISE § 56.
95. TREATISE § 52, supporting the compromise position of RESTATEMENT §
39.
96. RESTATEMENT § 64. See Household Fire etc., Ins. Co. v. Grant, 4 Ex. D.
216 (1879); Dunlop v. Higgins, 1 H. L. Cas. 381 (1848); Patrick v. Bowman,
149 U. S. 411 (1893); Lungstrass v. German Ins. Co., 48 Mo. 201 (1871); Horton
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 151 Mo. 604, 52 S. W. 356 (1899); Egger v. Nesbitt,
122 Mo. 667, 27 S. W. 385 (1894). The same doctrine is applied where there has
been a telegraphed acceptance of a telegraphed offer. Williams v. A. C. Burdick
& Co., 63 Ore. 41, 125 Pac. 844 (1912); C. W. Craig & Co. v. Jones & Co., 200
Ky. 113, 252 S. W. 574 (1923).
97. TREATISE § 81.
98. In the basic case of Adams v. Lindsell, 1 B. & A. 681 (1818), the court
held that communication was not necessary to acceptance; that the contract was
complete upon the overt act of assent by the offeree. Elaborating this argument,
see Ashley, Formation of Contract Inter Absentes (1902) 2 COL. L. REv. 15.
An ingenious explanation is offered in Nussbaum, Comparative Aspects of the
Anglo-American Offer-and-Acceptance Doctrine (1936) 36 CoL. L. REv. 920.
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rule has caused it to survive in an area placing increasing emphasis upon
communication of assent, and reliance by the other party upon manifesta-
tions of assent. Various apocryphal reasons have been assigned to explain
the anomaly. The idea of the postoffice as the agent of the offeror is
absurd. 9 The more conventional argument that the offeror was "au-
thorized" a reply by the same medium as was selected for communication
of the offer and undertakes to be bound by a reply delivered to this medium
for transmission, 100 is thrown into great doubt by the current tendency
to argue that the offeror impliedly "authorizes" acceptance by any rea-
sonable medium, and thus to declare effective when sent, telegraphed ac-
ceptances of mailed offers,' and certain cases of mailed acceptances of
offers orally made. 102 While Mr. Williston adopts this "authorization"
fiction as a means of attaining consistency, it would appear more helpful
to recognize it simply as an anomalous survival of a period adhering to a
theory of mutual assent different from that now prevailing. 10 3
99. Supra notes 74 and 75.
100. RESTATEMENT § 64: "An acceptance may be transmitted by any means
which the offeror has authorized the offeree to use and, if so transmitted, is
operative and completes the contract as soon as put out of the offeree's possession,
without regard to whether it ever reaches the offeror, unless the offer otherwise
provides." This authorization fiction is usually traced to Dunlop v. Higgins, 1
H. L. C. 381 (1848). The negative implication of the rule is sound in that the
offeror may specifically require that the acceptance be received by him to be
effective. TRaATIsE § 88, and cases cited.
101. RESTArEMENT § 66: "An acceptance is authorized to be sent by the
means used by the offeror or customary in similar transactions at the time when
and the place where the offer is received, unless the terms of the offer or sur-
rounding circumstances known to the offeree otherwise indicate." See Hodel, Com-
munication of Acceptance between Parties at a Distance (1930) 15 CORN. L. Q.
273. South Branch Cheese Co. v. American Butter & Cheese Co., 191 Mich. 507,
158 N. W. 158 (1916).
102. Henthorn v. Fraser, [1892] 2 Ch. 27. Cf. Scottish-American Mortgage
Co. v. Davis, 96 Tex. 504, 74 S. W. 17 (1903).
103. It would appear better to discard the language of authorization and
to state merely that, as a matter of business convenience, the offeree is to be
protected in relying upon the existence of a contract as soon as he has put his
acceptance in way to be communicated by any means customary or reasonable
under the circumstances, unless the offeree know or be reasonably charged with
notice that the offeror otherwise required. ANSON, CONTRACTS (5th Am. ed.
1930) 44. The offeror of course may minimize his own risk by express stipulation
as to the manner of communication, or by requiring actual receipt by him of
the acceptance. If one persists in supporting either the final irrevocable act
of acceptance theory or the postoffice-as-agent theory one must dispose of the
fact that under United States Postal Regulations, differing from the English
practice, the sender of a letter of acceptance may recall it from the mails at any
time prior to delivery to the addressee. Mr. Williston regards this as imma-
terial. TREATIsE § 86. Canterbury v. Bank of Sparta, 91 Wis. 53, 64 N. W. 311
(1895); Farmers' Guaranty State Bank v. Burrus Mill & Elevator Co., 207 S. W.
400 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918). Some cases however have regarded this circumstance
as sufficient to prevent the application of the conventional rule. Ex parte Cote,
9 Ch. 27 (1873); Guardian Nat. Bank v. Huntington County State Bank, 206
16
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Before leaving the topic of mutual assent, two additional cases must
be examined. The first is the case where a debtor makes a remittance to
his creditor of a part of the money claimed by the creditor, but accompanies
such remittance with a statement that it is sent as payment in full. The
creditor then accepts the money, or cashes the check as the case may be,
but notifies the sender that he does not take it as payment in full but
merely as a payment of account and that he expects the debtor to remit
the balance. In such a case there is clearly no actual meeting of the minds
of the parties. It is also clear that there is no apparent meeting of the
minds and that neither party is misled as to the position or intention of
the other.'0 Nevertheless, there is common agreement among the cases
that the creditor will be deemed to have agreed to accept the payment as
in full, and that, upon a showing of the required consideration, 10 5 will be
legally bound so to do. 10 There are of course contrary decisions, resting
upon the proof of a complete lack of mutual assent.1 7 Mr. Williston how-
ever approves the majority decisions finding a binding contract, and adopts
the common explanation that since the creditor may accept the money
only upon the condition on which it was tendered, namely that it be ac-
cepted as payment in full, his act of taking the money at variance with
the condition amounts to a tort, and that he should not be permitted to
defeat the claim of contract by alleging and proving his own tortious act.10 8
Similarly he supports'0 9 those cases finding a contract to pay for goods
Ind. 185, 187 N. E. 338 (1933); Traders' Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 142
Tenn. 229, 217 S. W. 977 (1920). Cases are collected in (1920) 9 A. L. R. 386,(1934) 92 A. L. R. 1062.
104. It would seem clear that in those cases where the remittance is re-
tained by a creditor without giving notice of his refusal to accept it as payment
in full, the ordinary objective standards of mutual assent would establish
the necessary promise. TREATISE § 1855. See Sparks v. Spaulding Mfg. Co., 158
Iowa 491, 139 N. W. 1083 (1893).
105. There are of course some cases which find an accord and satisfaction
in such cases without proof of consideration. Marysville Devel. Co. v. Hargis,
41 Idaho 257, 239 Pac. 522 (1925); (1926) 24 MIcH. L. REv. 412; Finlayson v.
Harris, 49 Idaho 697, 291 Pac. 1071 (1930). Cf. Schlessinger v. Schlessinger,
39 Colo. 44, 88 Pac. 970 (1907); Sawyer v. Somers Lbr. Co., 86 Mont. 169,
282 Pac. 852 (1929).
106. RESTATEMENT § 420. See Barham v. Kizzia, 100 Ark. 251, 140 S. W.
6 (1911); McCormick v. St. Louis, 166 Mo. 315, 65 S. W. 1038 (1901); Halloway
v. Mountain Grove Creamery Co., 286 Mo. 489, 229 S. W. 451 (1921); California
Bean Growers' Assoc. v. Rindge Land, etc., Co., 199 Cal. 168, 248 Pac. 658 (1926);
Blaisdell Filtration Co. v. Bayard & Co., 311 Pa. 6, 166 Atl. 234 (1933); Irwin
v. Pacific Fruit & Produce Co., 188 Wash. 572, 63 P. (2d) 382 (1936).
107. Day v. McLea, 22 Q. B. D. 610 (1889), so held and has been approved
by a few American courts. In others it has been expressly rejected. Whittaker
Chain Tread Co. v. Standard Auto Supply Co., 216 Mass. 204, 103 N. E. 695(1913).
108. TRFATiSE § 1856.
109. TRFATisE § 91D.
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which are accepted or retained by a person knowing or charged with no-
tice that they are tendered only on condition that he pay for them.110 The
practical justice of this result seems clear, but it is difficult to see the
logical necessity of refusing to permit the proof of tort, of holding that the
tortious taking is ipso facto a promise to pay. It would seem clear how-
ever that these cases really involve legally enforceable contracts not em-
bodying any element of mutual assent. To start with the proposition that
a contract must involve mutual assent, requires an argument here that
estoppel is equivalent to mutual assent, and leads to numerous difficulties.
Irrevocable offers. One of the most difficult questions in the law of
contracts has to do with the validity of an attempted revocation of an offer
for a unilateral contract after the offeree has begun to do the act requested
as an acceptance but before the act has been completed. Suppose D says
to P, "I will pay you fifty dollars if you will paint my cottage with two
coats of paint." P promptly begins the job, puts on one coat of paint and
is proceeding in a workmanlike manner with the second coat when D ap-
pears and states that the offer is revoked and that D is to discontinue his
work. On ordinary principles P has no remedy for breach of contract.
Normally an offer may be revoked at any time before acceptance. The
acceptance in this case was to have been the completion of the painting.
There has therefore been no acceptance. The hardship of such reasoning
and its result is apparent.
One solution of the problem suggested is that the offer be treated as
for a bilateral contract, and the beginning of the work by P as an implied
promise to complete it."" This is open to objection however on the ground
that it does violence to the plain intent of the offeror, D, and on the further
ground that it binds P to complete the work.1 - It is difficult to imagine
liability on the part of P in the supposed case, if he were to walk off the
job while the painting was unfinished. However in cases where the in-
tent is not entirely clear the courts tend to avoid the possible dilemma by
110. RESTATEMENT § 72(2). See Austin v. Burge, 156 Mo. App. 286, 137
S. W. 618 (1911); Frisby v. Hladky, 139 Kan. 517, 31 P. (2d) 1001 (1934);
Holland v. Brown, 66 S. W. (2d) 1095 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); Shulman v. Hart-
ford Public Library, 119 Conn. 428, 177 Atl. 269 (1935).
111. This reasoning is implicit in a number of cases and is explicit in a
few. See Los Angeles Trac. Co. v. Wilshire, 135 Cal. 654, 67 Pac. 1086 (1902).
See Parks, Effect of Offeror's Death on Outstanding Offer (1925) 23 MicH. L.
Rnv. 475, 478.
112. See Halloway v. Mountain Grove Creamery Co., 286 Mo. 489, 228 S. W.
451 (1920).
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construing the offer as for a bilateral contract.113 There is much to be said
for this conclusion.
Where it is impossible to construe the offer as other than for a un-
ilateral contract, the court must either reconcile itself to the harshness of
the theoretically plausible step of holding the offer to be revocable, 114 or
must reconcile itself to the necessity of discovering or inventing new prin-
ciples to care for this special case. One ever-present arrow in the judicial
quiver is labelled Estoppel, and it has been suggested that the offeror be
subjected to an estoppel in pais to revoke the offer under the facts sug-
gested. 115 The analogy however is not a perfect one. The most popular
solution is one most carefully elaborated by Professor McGovney," 8 and
suggests that the offer really consists of two parts: (a) an offer to pay for
the work if and when completed, and (b) a promise to keep the principal
offer open for acceptance provided the offeree shall begin and complete
the work with reasonable dispatch."' 7 The first part of the offer would be
accepted by the completion of the work, and the second or subsidiary part
by the beginning of the work within a reasonable time.
Mr. Williston's reaction to this problem is interesting. In his edition
of Pollock on Contracts"8 he states the problem and its various solutions
and concludes that the only proper decision is to hold the offer to be
revocable, however harsh the result might be. In the first edition of his own
Treatise,"9 the problem is re-examined particularly in light of McGovney's
113. RESTATEMENT § 31, states this in form of a "presumption" that the
offeror intended an offer for a bilateral contract. Interesting recent cases are:
Wood v. Lady Duff Gordon, 222 N. Y. 88, 118 N. E. 214 (1917); Poston v.
Western Dairy Products Co., 179 Wash. 73, 36 P. (2d) 65 (1934); Little Rock
Surgical Co. v. Bowers, 42 S. W. (2d) 367 (Mo. App. 1931); Davis v. Jacoby,
1 Cal. (2d) 370, 34 P. (2d) 1026 (1934); (1935) 23 CALi'. L. Rnv. 213; Hollidge
v. Gussow, Kahn & Co., 67 F. (2d) 459 (C. C. A. 1st, 1933). See Martin v. Ray
County Coal Co., 288 Mo. 241, 232 S. W. 149 (1921) ; American Pub. & Eng. Co.
v. Walker, 87 Mo. App. 503 (1901).
114. The best known case is Biggers v. Owen, 79 Ga. 658, 5 S. E. 193 (1887).
See Petterson v. Pattberg, 248 N. Y. 86, 161 N. E. 428 (1928). Wormser, The
True Conception of Unilateral Contracts (1916) 26 YALE L. J. 136.
115. See the cogent discussion in Ashley, Offers Calling for a Consideration
other than a Counter Promise (1910) 23 HARV. L. REv. 159; ASHLEY ON CoN-
TRACTS (1911) 78-88.
116. McGovney, Irrevocable Offers (1914) 27 HARV. L. REv. 644, 654-663.
See also, Ballantine, Acceptance of Offers for Unilateral Contracts by Partial
Performance of Service Requested (1921) 5 MINN. L. R-v. 94. Cf. Corbin, The
Formation of a Unilateral Contract (1918) 27 YAT. L. J. 382.
117. Enforcing a contract upon this or some similar theory, see Miles v.
Metzger, 316 Pa. 211, 173 AtI. 285 (1934); (1935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REV. 531;
Brackenbury v. Hodgkin, 116 Me. 399, 102 Ati. 106 (1917).
118. Supra note 9, at p. 34.
119. §§ 60 and 60a.
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proposal of subsidiary offer to keep the principal offer open. Mr. Williston
persists in his statement that it is impossible in theory to deny the right
of the offer to revoke. His instinct however indicates that the result is
inexcusably bad. However he refuses to accept the theory of subsidiary
promise; first, on the ground that it proceeds upon entirely artificial as-
sumptions of fact, and second, on the ground that it would operate to
make an offer irrevocable in any case in which the offeree has gone to
trouble and expense to prepare himself to accept the offer. His only
affirmative suggestion is something in the nature of a tort liability
on the part of the offeror for inducing the offeree to begin the work of
acceptance. 2 In the current revision of the Treatise; Mr. Williston states
that it is now difficult, but not impossible, to deny the right of the offeror
to revoke the offer while the offeree is in course of acceptance. 21 The
author now advocates the once-rejected thesis of subordinate offer to keep
the principal offer open a reasonable time for acceptance. 2 2 The theory
is finally stated in terms of the Restatement proposition that the offeror
becomes bound by a contract when the offeree begins the work of ac-
ceptance, the offeror's duty of performance of the contract being condi-
tioned upon the full performance being rendered or tendered by the of-
feree with the time permitted. 23
Few would quarrel with a decision allowing our hypothetical house-
painter to have an action for damages for breach of contract. 24 Many
would dispute the reasoning. This notion of a subordinate promise to keep
the offer open for acceptance appears open to Mr. Williston's original ob-
jection that it proceeds upon entirely artificial suppositions of fact. It is
also difficult to distinguish the case from one where the offeree has gone
to considerable expense to prepare to accept the offer, but has not actually
begun his acceptance. One wonders whether the whole difficulty is not
one of terminology. Mr. Williston speaks of the parties being bound as of
120. Citing G. Ober & Sons Co. v. Katzenstein, 160 N. C. 439, 76 S. E. 476(1912).
121. §§ 60 and 60A.
122. Subject to the limitation that the offeree must actually have started
the work of acceptance. Work and expense preliminary to the beginning of the
work requested would not suffice. Cf. Offord v. Davies, 12 C. B. (N. S.) 748
(1862).
123. RESTATEMENT § 45.
124. Under some foreign codes this result would be reached by a process of
interpretation. See Cornelson v. Sun Mutual Ins. Co., 7 La. Ann. 345 (1852).
The English Law Revision Committee of 1934 recommended the enactment of
a statute to give such a remedy. (1937) 15 Can. Bar Rev. 585, 606.
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a certain time. His context reveals that he is using the word in the sense
of implying ordinary duties under the contract. This of course raises
problems of mutuality and of consideration. It then appears to follow
that since the painter is not bound to complete the job, the owner is not
bound to let him continue. It would appear to be more accurate to speak
of a disabi7ity to revoke. The concept involves no more theoretical difficulty
than does the objective test of mutual assent. The making of an offer
in any case creates in the offeree a power to accept and to convert the offer
into a contract. The offeror at the stage prior to acceptance is not bound
in the ordinary sense, but he has incurred a definite liability in the making
of the offer, a liability which he can escape only by satisfying certain
legally imposed requirements for the revocation of his offer.125 His act of
making the offer calls forth certain expectations on the part of the offeree
and he is required to "make them good.' 1 28 In the housepainting situation
his act has called forth not only expectations but definite acts of detriment
to the offeree. His duty to "make good" is still present, is of the same
quality, but is correspondingly more onerous to discharge. There is also
available the apt analogy of promises enforced without consideration upon
a theory of promissory estoppel, based upon a substantial detriment
suffered by the promisee in reasonable and foreseeable misrelianee upon
the promise.127 In short the arguments against contractual relief for our
housepainter, as well as the common arguments in support of such relief,
appear to be based upon two rather questionable generalizations: (a) that
an offer is always revocable prior to acceptance ;128 and that an offer can
125. RESTATEMENT § 34: "An offer until terminated gives to the offeree a
continuing power to create a contract by acceptance of the offer." See Daddario
v. Town of Milford, 5 N. E. (2d) 23 (Mass. 1936), where a public works bidder
sought to withdraw his bid after the sealed bids had been opened but before any
bids had been accepted.
126. "In a commercial and industrial society, a claim or want or demand of
society that promises be kept and that undertakings be carried out in good faith,
a social interest in the stability of promises as a social and economic institution,
becomes of the first importance. This social interest in the security of transac-
tions, as one might call it, requires that we secure the individual interest of
the promisee, that is, his claim or demand to be assured in the expectation created,
which has become part of his substance." POUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOS-
OPHY oF LAW (1922) 237. The review of cases attempted in the present paper
makes it apparent that our common law notions of mutual assent are being
shaped to meet this demand.
127. Supra notes 29 and 30.
128. See Ashley, op. cit. supra note 115; McGovney, loc. cit. supra note
116. The cases dealing with the specific performance of option agreements are
also apposite here, but cannot be examined for want of space.
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create no obligation until the offeror shall have received in some considera-
tion of the conventional benefit-detriment type. 129
CONSIDERATION
Necessity. We have already seen that Mr. Williston, with others,130
defines Contract without including any concept of consideration therein.131
Certain formal promises are enforced, and for centuries have been enforced,
without consideration. - 2  While consideration is normally required in
informal contracts, there are even here situations in which consideration
may not be required. Chief among these would be the cases of promissory
estoppel, 33 and certain cases historically derived from Lord Mansfield's
concept of moral consideration. 34 Without examining these exceptions
further it is proposed to inquire into the nature of the consideration which
is normally required in informal contracts.
History. The history of consideration is bound up with the history of
Assumpsit. The history of the action shows that it descended from two
sources. 35 The first of these was an action akin to deceit, setting forth
injury to the promisee's person or goods resulting from his reliance upon
the promise. In modern law this tends to continue as an action in tort,
but it is also evident in the promissory estoppel cases previously men-
tioned. The other source of assuopsit was akin to the action of Debt,
wherein the promisee alleged that he had actually given something of value,
quid pro quw, in return for the promise. Our present notion of considera-
tion is built around this idea of an "exchange or price requested and re-
ceived by the promisor for the promise.'""' The typical informal contract
represents a bargain, and the bargain is expressed in consideration. To
Mr. Williston bargain means (a) contemporaneous, (b) exchange. If there
129. It has already been seen in the discussion of the nature of Contract
that we must either take the position that some contracts may be enforced with-
out consideration, or at least concede that it is no longer possible simply to de-
fine consideration as a benefit received or detriment incurred in exchange for the
promise.
130. Supra note 23.
131. TREATISE §§ 1 and 18.
132. Supra.
133. Supra notes 29 and 30.
134. Supra notes 25 and 26.
135. See generally, Ames, History of Assumpsit (1882) 2 HARV. L. Rnv.
1, 53; Ames, Two Theories of Consideration (1899) 12 HARv. L. REV. 515, 13 id.
at 29; Ames, Parol Contracts Prior to Assumpsit (1894) 8 HARv. L. REv. 252;
Holdsworth, Modern History of the Doctrine of Consideration (1922) 2 B. U. L.
REv. 87, 174; Beale, Gratuitous Undertakings (1891) 5 HARV. L. REV. 222.
136. TREATISE § 100.
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be no exchange but merely injury suffered in reliance on the promise, the
promise normally will not be enforced, and if it be enforced it must be
classed as a contract without consideration. 1 37 If there be no present ex-
change but the promise be voluntarily given in return for something done
or given in the past, the promise will be enforced only if it fall into one of
certain other categories of contract without consideration. 138
In dealing with consideration cases under this definition it is neces-
sary to inquire into two things: (a) the nature of the thing done or given;
and (b) the requisites of exchange.
The Nature of the Thing Done or Given. The stock definition of con-
sideration is substantially that of a detriment incurred by the promisee
or a benefit received by the promisor in return for the promise. The first
point to note is that benefit and detriment are to be defined in terms of
changes in the legal position of the party, rather than in terms of his ma-
terial or spiritual welfare.139 One incurs a legal detriment when he does
that which he is legally not bound to do, when he gives up that which
he is legally privileged to keep, when he refrains from doing that which
he has a legal right or privilege to do. One receives a legal benefit when
he receives some performance or forbearance which he is not legally en-
titled to receive. Refraining from smoking is probably an actual benefit
to the promisee, but is a legal detriment.14 0 Refraining from an assault on
the promisor may be of such benefit to the promisor that he be willing
to pay for it, but it does not confer a legal benefit.' 41 This shift from the
quid pro quo of actual benefit, to the present test of legal benefit or det-
riment has given rise to the frequently heard charge that consideration
has degenerated to a mere formality142 and has contributed in part to the
agitation for its abolition. However it must be recognized that a part of
this dissatisfaction is based upon an emotional belief in the intrinsic moral
137. Promissory estoppel is the most likely classification.
138. Those promises enforced on past consideration are so classified.
139. TREATISE § 102A.
140. Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N. Y. 538, 27 N. E. 256 (1891); Talbott v.
Stemmons, 89 Ky. 222, 12 S. W. 297 (1889); Hoshour v. Kautz, 19 Wash. 258,
53 Pac. 51 (1898). See RESTA'EMENT § 76.
141. See Tolhurst v. Powers, 133 N. Y. 460, 31 N. E. 326 (1892); Throck-
morton v. Robinson, 83 S. W. (2d) 696 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); (1935) 22 VA. L.
Rv. 224.
142. Lorenzen, loc. cit. supra note 30. See Ballantine, and Wright, both
supra note 30.
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validity of all promises; that the fact that the promise was made is suf-
ficient reason to enforce it.1' 4
By Whcm Done or Given. The stock definition of consideration as a
detriment incurred by the promisee or a benefit received by the promisor
in return for the promises, would appear to require that the promise he
held unenforceable unless the detriment was incurred by the person to
whom the promise was made. There is some authority for such a state-
ment.'" It was on a similar ground that the English cases refused and to
some extent still refuse to permit an action on a contract by an intended
third-party beneficiary. 14 ' However as Mr. Williston points out'" the im-
portant question should be whether the detriment was incurred in ex-
change for the promise, not by whom it was incurred. 47 Thus if in return
for the promise of the purchaser of a business to assume the debts owed
by the business to a certain wholesaler, the wholesaler in return promises
the seller of the business to discharge him of further liability, the novation
should be enforced."' Similarly a question might be raised as to whether
the benefit relied on as consideration must have been received by the
promisor. That it is not so required would appear clear.' 49 The ordinary
contract of guaranty is a simple illustration.'50
In view of these points, consideration in simple bargains must be
defined merely as a legal detriment incurred or a legal benefit conferred in
exchange for the promise.151
Benefit Alone as Consideration. The stock definitions of considera-
tion state it in alternative form of benefit or detriment. Normally this is
143. There is of course a countervailing emotional belief that the technical
rules of the common law embody the ultimate of good reason. See Hamson,
The Reform of Consideration (1938) 54 L. Q. REv. 233.
144. See (1916) 32 L. Q. REv. 6.
145. Bourne v. Mason, 1 Vent. (1669); Tweddle v. Atkinson, 1 Best & Smith
393 (1861); Dunlop Tyre Co. v. Selfridge, [1915] A. C. 847. See Corbin, Con-
tracts for the Benefit of Third Persons (1929) 46 L. Q. REV. 12. The English
Law Revision Committee of 1934 recommended the abolition of this English rule
so as to conform to American practice. (1937) 15 CAN. BAR Ruv. 585, 609-615.
146. TRATis § 114.
147. Where the consideration claimed moves from a third person there may
be a question as to whether a contract has ever been made, or whether the
element of exchange was present.
148. TRFATisE §§ 1865-1875; RESTATEMENT §§ 425 and 427; Scharflm
Distilling Co. v. Springfield Coal Co., 180 Mo. App. 497, 166 S. W. 654 (1914);
Chatterley v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 168 Md. 656, 178 Ati. 854 (1935) ; Packel
v. McCarthy, 120 Pa. Super. 545, 182 Ati. 769 (1936).
149. TREATISE § 113.
150. See also, Sears v. Krekel, 184 S. W. 911 (Mo. App. 1916).
151. RESTATEMENT § 75.
24
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 3 [1938], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol3/iss3/1
WILLISTON'S FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTIONS
sufficient, since a legal detriment incurred on the one side will be reflected
in a legal benefit on the other. It has been argued however that legal de-
triment alone is the true test of consideration; that the absence of legal
detriment will prevent the enforcement of the promise, regardless of
possible legal benefit to the promisor.15 2 Historically, the argument is per-
haps unimpeachable. However the persistence of the alternative definition
justifies an inquiry as to whether legal benefit to the promisor is sufficient
to sustain the contract, even though not accompanied by legal detriment
to the promisee. A frequently debated proposition will illustrate the
problem.
A is a contractor and agrees to erect a hotel building for B upon land
owned by B, in return for a certain sum which B agrees to pay. A begins
the work. C is the owner of land across the street from the hotel site and,
upon learning of the proposed hotel immediately begins the construction
of a garage and automobile parking station to handle the business which
may be expected to develop from guests arriving at the hotel by motor.
When A has proceeded part way with the construction of the hotel he
suspends work and states that he will not continue unless B will promise
to pay an additional $10,000 therefor. While B is debating this proposal,
C goes to A and promises that he, C, will pay A $5000 if he will complete
the hotel. Later B surrenders and promises A the additional $10,000 on
completion. A then completes the job and, the payments being refused,
brings separate actions against B and C for $10,000 and $5000 respectively.
According to the overwhelming weight of authority, A's action against
B must fail.'53 There is no legal detriment to A in completing the hotel
since he does no more than he is already legally obligated to do.'" There
is no legal benefit to B since he is already legally entitled to have the hotel
built. The arguments in favor of the enforcement of the promise of ad-
152. Langdell, Mutual Promises as Consideration for Each Other (1901) 14
HARv. L. REv. 496; POLLOCK ON CONTRACTS (10th ed. 1936) 183. Cf. Ames, Two
Theories of Consideration (1899) 12 HARv. L. REv. 515.
153. One of the best known cases is Lingenfelder v. Wainright Brewing Co.,
103 Mo. 578, 15 S. W. 844 (1890). See also, Leggett v. Vinson, 155 Miss. 411,
124 So. 472 (1929); Hilde v. International Harvester Co., 166 Minn. 259, 207
N. W. 617 (1926); RESTATEMENT § 76.
154. Of course if there be an honest and reasonable dispute between the
parties as to whether A is required to proceed under the contract in view of
certain changed circumstances, or if there be such a difference of opinion as to
the proper interpretation of the contract, there would be consideration for the
new promise. Brodeck v. Farnum, 11 Wash. 565, 40 Pac. 189 (1895). Cf. Blakes-
lee v. Board of Water Commissioners, 106 Conn. 642, 139 Atl. 106 (1927).
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ditional compensation are three. Occasionally one encounters an argument
to the effect that any promise seriously made should be enforced. This
does not define consideration, but denies its necessity. The second argu-
ment reduces itself to the idea that a party to a contract has a legal right
to break the contract and to pay damages. The act of the contractor in
not breaking the contract is then called the relinquishment of a legal right,
and hence consideration.155 As an ethical proposition this runs counter to
basic assumptions in contract law. It is generally assumed that the pay-
ment of damages is not performance but is a feeble effort on the part of
the law to enforce a substitute for performance. 56 True there is an un-
doubted power to break the contract, but by the same token refraining
from murder would be legal consideration. The third argument is that
the parties in effect rescind the old contract and then make a new one.
If they have actually done this there would be consideration. So long as
something remains to be done on both sides there is consideration for
rescission.'57 The new agreement would find its consideration in the mutual
promises to do the work and to pay therefor. However in the instant case
this reasoning cannot well apply, since the parties were never free, even
for an instant, from the obligations of the first agreement.'58
Adopting the majority and correct rule denying A recovery against
B, let us look at his rights against C. By the reasoning above, A incurs no
legal detriment in completing the work, and most cases have held this suf-
ficient to prevent an action by A against C for the added compensation." 9
However, we must also consider the fact that when A completes the hotel
as agreed, C receives a benefit for which he bargained and to which he was
not legally entitled. If legal benefit to the promisor is sufficient to sustain
a contract, then C should pay A the $5000 as promised. Some cases have
155. This view has the eminent support of HOLMES, COMMON LAW (1881)
300 et seq. See also, Lattimore v. Harsen, 14 Johns. 330 (1817); Munroe v.
Perkins, 9 Pick. 298 (1830). This argument appears to be disposed of in Barbour,
The Right to Break a Contract (1917) 16 MICH. L. REv. 106.
156. The situation must be distinguished from a true alternative contract
where the promise is to do an act or to pay a sum of money. In such a case
the payment of the money would constitute performance of the contract, and a
subsequent agreement to do the act and to forego the alternative of payment
would supply a consideration.
157. TREATISE § 1829.
158. See Williston, Successive Promises of the Same Performance (1894) 8
HARv. L. REv. 27; TREATISE § 130A.
159. Such appears to be the overwhelming majority rule in this country.
McDevitt v. Stokes, 174 Ky. 515, 192 S. W. 681 (1917).
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so held.1 " In solving this problem, Mr. Williston discards the historical
arguments of Ames, Langdell, and Pollock,' 6 and concludes that legal
benefit to the promisor is sufficient.162
It has been suggested, by eminent authority, 3 that a distinction might
be drawn in this case between bilateral and unilateral contracts. It is
argued that where our contractor A promises C to complete the hotel for
B, he should be allowed to enforce C's counter-promise. In such a case
it is said that A has now subjected himself to liability to C in event the
work be not completed. While this argument may be questioned as merely
assuming the answer, it is really but a phase of the more troublesome ques-
tion of whether a promise is consideration in a bilateral contract.
Promises as Consideration. One of the earliest reported cases on
bilateral contracts stated simply that "a promise against a promise will
maintain an action upon the case." 16 It is familiar history that this state-
ment was read literally for years with the courts holding that the mere
act of making the promise satisfied the requirement of consideration, so
that one who had promised to do an act in return for the promise of an-
other to render some performance might have an action for damages for
breach of the promise of the other although the plaintiff had failed or re-
fused to render his own performance. 65 It was only some 150 years ago
that the courts openly admitted that the parties really intended an ex-
change of performances, and our law of constructive conditions was born. 66
Strangely enough Ames, within the last half-century, has advocated a
160. Such is said to be the rule in England, although the cases are not
entirely clear. POLLOCK ON CONTRACTS (10th ed. 1936) 183. See Abbott v.
Doane, 163 Mass. 433, 40 N. E. 197 (1895); Briskin v. Packard Motor Car Co.,
269 Mass. 386, 169 N. E. 148 (1929). Cf. DeCicco v. Schweizer, 221 N. Y. 431,
117 N. E. 807 (1917). In spite of the decided weight of authority opposed to en-
forcement, RESTATEMENT § 84(d) takes the position that the promise should be
enforced. Williams v. Sawyer Bros., 45 F. (2d) 700 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930). The
English Law Revision Committee of 1934 recommended legislation to make this
rule of enforcement explicit. (1937) 15 CAN. BAn REv. 585, 605.
161. Supra note 151.
162. TREATISE §§ 102 and 131. See also, Morgan, Benefit to the Promisor
as Consideration for a Second Promise of the Same Act (1917) 1 MINN. L. REV.
383; Corbin, Does a Pre-Existing Duty Defeat Consideration (1918) 27 YALE
L. J. 362. Cf. Goodhart, Blackmail and Consideration in Contracts (1928)
44 L. Q. REv. 436.
163. Beale, Notes on Consideration (1903) 17 Harv. L. Rev. 71; Langdell,
Mutual Promises as Consideration for Each Other (1901) 14 HARv. L. REV. 496;
POLLOCK ON CONTRACTS (10th ed. 1936) 185.
164. Strangborough v. Warner, 4 Leon. 3 (1588).
165. Nichols v. Raynbred, Hobart 88 (1615); Pordage v. Cole, 1 Wms.
Saund. 319 (1669).
166. Kingston v. Preston, 2 Doug. 689 (1773); Goodisson v. Nunn, 4 T. R.
761 (1792).
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definition of consideration in bilateral contracts which harks back to the
medieval idea of attaching some mystic aspect to the act of promising.167
Langdell reached a position not far removed.16
Limitations of space prevent an exploration of this most interesting
field, and we can but report upon the notion of consideration enunciated in
Mr. Williston's Treatise and, incidentally, in the Contracts Restatement.
Mr. Williston's postulates appear to be two: (a) that while the parties
are exchanging promises this is merely preliminary to the real purpose of
the contract, namely the exchange of performances; and (b) that if the
performance of the promise would not be sufficient consideration to sustain
a contract, there is no just or logical reason why the mere promise to do
that thing should have greater validity. In summary of his conclusions:
1. A promise which is not capable of becoming legally binding cannot
be consideration for a return promise.' 89 This would exclude promises made
by persons devoid of contractual capacity, illegal promises declared by law
to be void as distinguished from merely unenforceable. 7 0 Promises which
are voidable for want of full contractual capacity or because of fraud, etc.,
would be sufficient consideration.' 7 1
2. A promise in a bilateral contract which by its terms may be per-
formed without detriment to the promisor or benefit to the promisee is in-
sufficient considerationY.'2  Here too we encounter the illusory promise
where the promisor really does not bind himself to do anything, where
the promisor states that he will do so-and-so if it shall please him so to do.
Such a promise or purported promise cannot be a consideration. 173 A
promise of course may be conditional, provided the condition be not en-
tirely within the control of the promisor, or if it be within his control pro-
vided the bringing about of the condition would itself create the requisite
benefit or detriment. 174 Promises in the alternative are consideration pro-
vided each and every alternative involves the necessary benefit or detri-
ment. 
75
167. Ames, loe. cit. supra note 135.
168. Langdell, Mutual Promises as a Consideration for Each Other (1901)
14 HARV. L. REv. 496.
169. TREATISE § 103E; RESTATEMENT § 80.
170. RESTATEMENT §§ 599-609.
171. TREATISE § 105; RESTATEMENT § 84(e). See McGowen v. West, 7 Mo.
569 (1842) (statute of frauds); Baker v. Kennett, 54 Mo. 82 (1873) (infancy).
172. TREATISE § 104; RESTATEMENT § 78. See generally, TREATISE §§ 103-
103D.
173. TREATISE §§ 37-49; RESTATEMENT §§ 32 and 33.
174. RESTATEMENT § 77.
175. RESTATEMENT § 79; TREATISE § 104A.
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3. In a bilateral contract each promise must involve prospective det-
riment or benefit and otherwise be sufficient to sustain a contract. 176 If
the promise on the one side is insufficient, the promise on the other side be-
comes unenforceable for want of consideration and the entire contract fails.
The Exchange. As has been seen, 'Mr.. Williston defines consideration
in informal contracts in terms of bargain. Consideration is legal detriment
incurred or legal benefit conferred in return for the promise. Certain
consequences follow:
1. No act or forbearance done in ignorance of the promise can be
consideration therefor.'17  This matter is usually discussed in terms of
mutual assent, it being said that the offeree cannot assent to an offer of
which he knows nothing. 7 8 Except in certain cases of rewards 7 the cases
are agreed on this point. 80 From the stated premise, it follows that where
a part of the act is done before knowledge of the offer is brought to the
offeree he cannot recover. In such a case a part only of the consideration
has been given in exchange for the promise. 8 '
2. No benefit conferred or detriment incurred prior to the making of
the promise can be consideration therefor."8 2 There are of course in-
stances in which promises are enforced upon so-called "past" considera-
tion. Familiar among these are: a promise by an adult person to perform
an existing contract voidable because made during the infancy of the
promisor ;183 a promise made by a competent person to perform a contract
176. TREATISE § 103E.
177. TREATISE § 33.
178. RESTATEMENT § 23, qualifying the statement of course by the exclusion
of the cases relating to documents negligently signed in ignorance of their con-
tents. Sapra notes 82-87.
179. In some of the cases involving rewards offered by public authority the
requirement of knowledge is evaded by regarding the reward as a matter of
public grant rather than contract. See Choice v. City of Dallas, 210 S. W. 753
(Tex. Civ. App. 1919). In some cases, even of private rewards, the element of
notice has been disregarded. Dawkins v. Sappington, 26 Ind. 199 (1866). How-
ever a majority of the reward cases apply ordinary contract principles and re-
quire knowledge of the offer at the time the act is done. Broadnax v. Ledbetter,
100 Tex. 375, 99 S. W. 1111 (1907); Fitch v. Snedaker, 38 N. Y. 248 (1868);
Hewitt v. Anderson, 56 Cal. 476 (1880); Smith v. Vernon County, 188 Mo. 501,
87 S. W. 949 (1905).
180. See James & Son v. Marion Fruit Jar & Bottle Co., 69 Mo. App. 207
(1897).
181. TREATISE § 33A; RESTATEMENT § 53; Williams v. West Chicago Street
R. R., 191 Ill. 610, 61 N. E. 456 (1901); Arkansas Bankers Ass'n v. Ligon, 174
Ark. 234, 295 S. W. 4 (1927). See however, Hoggard v. Dickerson, 180 Mo.
App. 70, 165 S. W. 1135 (1914). The reward cases, pro and con, are collected
in (1928) 53 A. L. R. 542.
182. TREATISE §§ 100 and 142; RESTATEMENT § 75(1).
183. TREATISE §§ 151-154; RESTATEMENT § 89; Lee v. Equitable Life Assur.
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voidable by him because of prior mental incompetency;' 8' a promise by
a surety to perform a contract from which he has been previously dis-
charged by operation of law because of a modification of the principal con-
tract or other technical reason; a promise by a discharged bankrupt to
pay a debt discharged in the bankruptcy; 1  a promise to pay a debt barred
by the Statute of Limitations.1 87 A majority of the courts enforce a promise
to pay for a benefit previously conferred at the request of the promisor,1'8
but most of these cases can be supported on a present consideration on
the theory that the original request created an implied promise to pay,
and the new express promise, assented to by the promisee, establishes a
valid liquidation of the unliquidated claim. 89 Mr. Williston has no quarrel
with the cases enforcing promises of the types suggested above, but he
classes them as promises enforced without consideration.
3. No detriment incurred in rdiance on the promise but not requested
in return therefor can be consideration. 9 ' Such promises may sometimes
be enforced upon some theory of promissory estoppel,19' but are classed
as promises without consideration.
4. The promisee in doing the act or forbearance requested must do so
with an intent to exchange his performance for the promise. This is usually
stated in terms of mutual assent; that the promisee must act with an in-
tent to accept the offer.'19 2 That it appear that he had some additional mo-
Soc., 195 Mo. App. 40, 189 S. W. 1195 (1916). This is now covered by statute in
numerous states including Missouri. See also, TRE&TISE § 239.
184. TREATISE §§ 155 and 253; RasTATEMENT § 89. Both the infancy and
insanity cases may be treated under the heading of ratification of voidable
agreements, although it is a matter of history that they were once treated under
the head of moral consideration. In modern law it is sometimes said that if the
contract of a mental incompetent is legally void, the subsequent promise will not
be enforced. This is similar to the common law rule refusing to enforce promises
made by women after discoverture to perform "contracts" made during prior
marriage. TREATISSE § 156; Musick v. Dodson, 76 Mo. 624 (1882).
185. TREATISe § 157; RESTATEMENT § 88(1).
186. TREATISE § 158; RESTATEMENT § 87; cases cited supra note 61.
187. TREATISsE §§ 160 et seq.; RESTATEMENT § 86; supra note 62.
188. TREATISm §§ 144-146.
189. Moore v. Elmer, 180 Mass. 15, 61 N. E. 259 (1901); Montgomery v.
Downer, 116 Iowa 632, 88 N. W. 810 (1902); Friedman v. Suttle, 10 Ariz. 57, 85
Pac. 726 (1906). A large number of cases make this distinction as to whether
the prior request created an implied promise to pay. Some courts however
would appear to make the test solely whether the services were rendered on
request. Still other cases will enforce the new promise merely on a showing that
the past services benefited the promisor. See Shugart v. Shugart, 111 Tenn. 179,
76 S. W. 821 (1903).
190. TREATISE § 100; RESTATEMENT § 75, comment c.
191. TREATISE §§ 100, 138-141; RESTATEMENT § 90. Cases are collected supra
notes 29, 30, 57-59.
192. TREATISE § 67; RESTATEMENT § 55.
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tive or purpose is insufficient to prevent the formation of a contract,/9
but a showing that he was entirely activated by some motive other than
contractual, that contractual intent was completely negatived, would pre-
vent recovery.1"'
MISCELLANY
It is believed that the foregoing states Mr. Williston's conception of a
contract, and demonstrates the foundation upon which the entire Treatise
is built. Nothing has been said about the legality of the purpose of the
contract. Contrary to the opinion of some writers, Mr. Williston considers
this as normally immaterial on the issue of whether a contract has been
made.195 While normally the illegality of the contract will prevent its
enforcement by direct action, such agreements are not void in the sense
that they are entirely without legal consequences. Indeed some such con-
tracts are enforced by direct action. " "
A considerable portion of the Treatise is taken up by discussions of
various special phases of contract law or of special types of contracts.
Included are such things as Contracts of Agents and Fiduciaries, Con-
tracts for the Sale of Land, Sales, Contracts of Employment, Contracts
to Marry, Contracts of Bailment and Inn keepers, Transportation Con-
tracts of Carriers, Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes, Contracts of
Suretyship; surely a catholic collection. Of these chapters there is much
193. TRa& Sis § 111.
194. This problem is acute in certain reward situations. Thus in Vitty v.
Eley, 51 App. Div. 44, 64 N. Y. Supp. 397 (4th Dep't 1900), it appeared that the
plaintiff's principal if not sole motive in giving information was to prevent his
own arrest for complicity in the crime. The court found as a fact that the in-
formation was induced by "fear of arrest, and without any expectation of receiv-
ing the reward" and denied recovery. See Hewitt v. Anderson, 56 Cal. 476
(1880). In Gallagher v. Garrett, 144 Md. 241, 124 Atl. 898 (1923), where the
court was dividing a reward among numerous claimants, it found that the woman
claimant gave information with mixed motives of obtaining money and keeping
her husband out of trouble. On this basis the court allowed her to share in the
reward but reduced the amount. The case responsible for a great deal of the
trouble is Williams v. Carwardine, 4 B. & Ald. 621 (1833). Here it appeared
that the plaintiff thought she was about to die and gave the information to "ease
her conscience." With this load off her mind she regained her health and sued
for the reward. Judgment was given the plaintiff, the court stating that she
had given the information and that her motives would not be examined. This
case has been construed in some American cases as obviating the necessity of
contractual intent in reward cases. Dawkins v. Sappington, 26 Ind. 199 (1866).
195. TREATISE § 19.
196. Such as the familiar case of allowing a plaintiff, ignorant of the fact
of the defendant's existing marriage, to maintain an action for breach of mar-
riage promise against a promisor with a living and undivorced spouse. RESTATE-
MENT § 599.
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good to be said. They are concise presentations of the law on particular
subjects and on the whole are of equal or better quality than the sep-
arate treatises covering these subjects. There is little analysis in penetrat-
ing detail and the expert in these subjects can find occasional statements
with which to quarrel, but on the whole the result is good.
Limitations of space prevent a present treatment of the more general
topics contained in the work. Mention may be made of a few. As in the
first edition, the discussion of implied and constructive conditions, waiver,
excuse and similar topics, is excellent. No better source is available. The
discussion of the Statute of Frauds is full and helpful, but appears to be
inadequate in the matter of the consequences of failure to comply with the
statute. The profession might well be made better acquainted with the
possible remedies in quasi-contract and related fields. There seems also to
be a deficiency in the chapter on joint rights and duties. The common
law doctrines are stated in sufficient detail, but nowadays most of us have
to work with statutes purporting to cover all or part of the field. These
statutes are easily classified into but a few types, and a detailed analysis
and discussion of these statutes by types, in their relation to the common
law rules, would be helpful.
The discussions of special defenses such as fraud, mistake, and duress,
are detailed and complete, but may be open to the criticism that they main-
tain distinctions between legal and equitable defenses which tend to become
more and more unusable as time passes.
In the chapter on assignments there is a distinct historical bias. It
is true that the common law, in competition with Chancery, developed the
law of assignments for value on a theory of irrevocable agency. It is also
true that the common law, not required to compete with Chancery, gave
scant protection to gratuitous assignments unless accompanied by cir-
cumstances sufficient to establish a common law gift, as by delivery of a
deed of gift, delivery of a document embodying the right, et cetera. How-
ever it is believed that the present law of assignment has passed well be-
yond the simple agency stage, and that few courts would announce as a
major premise that a chose in action cannot be the subject of an effective
transfer of ownership. Mr. Williston however continues to analyze the
problem in terms of agency, notwithstanding this method gets him into
trouble with some modern American authority. He also insists upon pre-
serving the classical distinctions between legal and equitable assignments,
distinctions which are rapidly going into discard.
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Mr. Williston's earlier writings and the first edition of the Treatise
displayed a considerable hostility toward the doctrine of actionable repudia-
tion or anticipatory breach. In the present edition he appears to have
relaxed in part, and to have taken a more realistic position that he can
contribute more by directing the remedy into its proper channels and
confining it to reasonable limits, than he can contribute by continued con-
demnation.
Candor requires that another point be mentioned. The present edition
of the Treatise contains an enormous mass of case citation, more than any
two authors could verify in detail. It is inevitable that the reader is dis-
appointed from time to time by finding that the cases cited do not all bear
out completely the textual statement. Somehow it seems neither necessary
nor desirable that a masterful treatise such as this undertake also to con-
tain the literally overwhelming mass of contract authorities in encyclopedic
fashion.
Minor carping aside, we can but reiterate the opinions of the great
men in the field that Williston is still the best book in print relating to
Anglo-American contract law. One feels also that Professor Thompson has
contributed much to this revision, and that the future of this work would
rest safely in his hands.
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